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I. INTRODUCTIONA sis the case most years, there were no monumental partnership-
law cases for this Survey period. There was, however, one case
of first impression dealing with the consequences for limited lia-
bility partnerships that do not maintain registered status. Other cases
covered are a sampling of the types of issues that are litigated among
partners or that otherwise involve partnerships, including some procedu-
ral issues that frequently arise in partnership cases. None will change the
face of Texas law.
II. CASES
A. COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY LLP REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS-DOES A PARTNER OF AN LLP RECEIVE LIMITED
LIABILITY PROTECTION IF THE LLP DOES NOT CONTINUOUSLY
COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS?-
APCAR INVESTMENT PARTNERS VI, LTD. V. GAUS 1
In a case of first impression, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that a
partnership must be in compliance with the statutory LLP registration
requirements for the partners to receive protection from individual liabil-
ity.2 On March 6, 1995, Smith & West, L.L.P. registered as a domestic
limited liability partnership under the Texas Revised Partnership Act.3
On August 11, 1999, the LLP entered into a sixty-month lease for office
space with MF Partners I, Ltd.4 Michael Gaus and John West, the LLP's
partners, personally guaranteed the LLP's performance under the lease
during the first twenty-four months. MF Partners I, Ltd. assigned its
landlord's interest in the lease to Apcar Investment Partners VI, Ltd.
("Apcar"). According to Apcar, the LLP stopped paying rent and aban-
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., San Antonio, Texas.
** B.B.A., Texas A&M University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Richardson, Texas.
1. 161 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet. h.).
2. Id. at 140, 142.





doned the leased premises as of October 31, 2002.5 Apcar filed suit for
breach of lease against the LLP, Gaus, and West. Gaus and West moved
for summary judgment, arguing that they were not individually liable for
the LLP's lease obligations because they are partners in a limited liability
partnership, and they personally guaranteed the LLP's performance
under the lease only for its first two years. 6 Apcar moved for partial sum-
mary judgment, claiming that Gaus and West were personally liable for
the LLP's lease obligations because the LLP was not a registered limited
liability partnership when it entered the lease.7 The court of appeals
noted, "No Texas case has addressed the issue before this court. ''8
Under the Texas Revised Partnership Act, "a partner in a registered
limited liability partnership is not individually liable . . . for debts and
obligations ... incurred while the partnership is a registered limited liabil-
ity partnership." 9 The LLP's status as a registered limited liability part-
nership expired in 1996. Thus, Apcar argued that Gaus and West were
personally liable for the debts incurred on a lease created in 1999.10 Gaus
and West asserted that the LLP's initial status as a registered limited lia-
bility partnership protected them from individual liability on lease obliga-
tions that arose after their two-year guarantee expired." They relied on
limited partnership cases, which have held that strict compliance with
statutory filing requirements is not necessary to protect the limited part-
ners from individual liability.12
To register as a limited liability partnership, a partnership must file a
completed initial or renewal application with the secretary of state and
pay the required fee.13 An initial application expires one year after the
date of registration unless it is renewed annually. 14 To renew a limited
liability partnership registration, the partnership must file a renewal ap-
plication with the secretary of state and pay a fee of $200 for each part-
ner.15 The renewal registration is effective for one year from the date
that the effective registration otherwise would expire. 16
5. Id.
6. Id. at 138-39.
7. Id. at 139.
8. Id. at 140.




12. Id. at 141 (citing Laney v. Comm'r, 674 F.2d 342, 347-48 (5th Cir. 1982); Shindler v.
Marr & Assocs., 695 S.W.2d 699, 702-04 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Garret v. Koepke, 569 S.W.2d 568, 570-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Voudouris v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 560 S.W.2d 202, 207-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ)).
13. Id. at 140 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08(b)(4) (Vernon
Supp. 2004-05)).
14. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2004-
05)).





In this case, the LLP filed its initial application to register the partner-
ship as a limited liability partnership on March 6, 1995.17 The LLP did
not renew that registration; thus, the LLP's status as a registered limited
liability partnership expired on March 6, 1996. The court stated that, be-
cause the LLP was not a registered limited liability partnership when it
incurred the lease obligations, "the clear language of Article 6132b-
3.08(a)(1) supports Apcar's position that Gaus and West are not pro-
tected from individual liability for the lease obligations." 18 The court of
appeals also distinguished limited partnership cases from limited liability
partnership cases on two bases.19 First, applying the reasoning of the lim-
ited-partnership cases "would conflict with the clear language of Article
6132b-3.08," which "provides that partners are protected from individual
liability only for debts and obligations that are incurred while the partner-
ship is a registered limited liability partnership. ' 20 Second, the Texas Re-
vised Limited Partnership Act has a "substantial compliance" provision
that is not present in Article 6132b-3.08. 21 The Texas Revised Limited
Partnership Act provides that "a limited partnership is formed at the time
of the filing of the initial certificate of limited partnership with the secre-
tary of state or at a later date or time specified in the certificate if there
has been substantial compliance with the requirements of this section. '22
If the Texas Legislature intended limited liability partners to only sub-
stantially comply with registration requirements, they knew how to and
would have done so. Therefore, the court of appeals held "that a partner-
ship must be in compliance with the registration requirements in Article
6132b-3.08(b) for its partners to receive protection from individual liabil-
ity under Article 6132b-3.08(a)(1). ' '2 3 The LLP was not a registered lim-
ited liability partnership when it entered into the lease and incurred the
lease obligations, and accordingly, Gaus and West were not protected
from individual liability for the lease obligations. 24
B. WINDING UP A PARTNERSHIP-How SHOULD A CAPITAL
ACCOUNT IMBALANCE BE COMPUTED IN THE ABSENCE OF A
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT REGARDING SHARING LOSSES?-
FARNSWORTH V. DEAVER
2 5
In this case, the Amarillo Court of Appeals applied the Texas Revised
Partnership Act to the winding up of a partnership because there was no
partnership agreement that covered how the partners would share
17. Id.
18. Id. at 140-41.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 142. This is a crucial distinction on which the limited-partnership cases heav-
ily rely.
22. Id. at 141-42 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 2.01(b) (Vernon
Supp. 2004-05)) (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 142.
24. Id.
25. 147 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004. no pet.).
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losses.26 Johnny and Janie Farnsworth and John and Carol Deaver en-
tered into a partnership, which later dissolved.27 The jury found that the
Farnsworths had a capital account balance of $22,080.68, and the Deavers
a capital account balance of $34,349.41.28 The jury ordered the Farn-
sworths to pay the Deavers $6,134.37, half of the difference between
those balances.29
Because the Deavers and Farnsworths did not have a partnership
agreement that controlled the manner in which the capital accounts were
to be settled, the Texas Revised Partnership Act filled that gap.30 Under
the Act, when winding up a partnership, a partner "shall contribute to the
partnership an amount equal to that partner's negative balance in the
partner's capital account. ' 31 Because a partnership that is being wound
up must make distributions to partners equal to the positive balances in
the partners' capital accounts, the "capital accounts having a positive bal-
ance are debts of the partnership. ' 32 Partners share these capital losses
in the same proportion as they share the profits.33
On dissolution in this case, the partnership owed a debt of $56,430.09,
the sum of the balances in the partners' capital accounts. 34 The Farn-
sworths and the Deavers agreed to share the profits equally; thus, they
shared losses equally under the Texas Revised Partnership Act.35 Each
couple would owe $28,215.04 to cover the capital loss, assuming that the
partnership had no cash left after paying all other debts.36 When this
amount was offset by each partner's capital account balance, the Deavers
had a positive capital account balance of $6,134.37, and the Farnsworths
had a negative capital balance of $6,134.26.37 However, evidence pro-
duced at trial indicated that the partnership had $880 in cash remaining
after paying all of the partnership's other debts38 that was not taken into
consideration by the trial court in computing the capital losses of each
partner. Therefore, the amounts determined by the trial court were in-
correct, but the basic application of the statute to the facts was correct
and thus upheld. 39
26. Id. at 664 n.2.
27. Id. at 663-64.
28. Id. at 664 n.1.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 664 n.2.
31. Id. at 664 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 8.06(b) (Vernon Supp.
2004-05)).
32. Id. (citing 2 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP § 7.10(b) (2004)).
33. Id. (citing 2 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP § 7.10(b) (2004); TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 4.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05)).





39. Id. at 666. The Farnsworths' negative capital balance was $5,694.36 after applying
their half of the $880.
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C. EXISTENCE OF A PARTNERSHIP-DOES THE EVIDENCE SUPPORT A
JURY'S FINDING OF A PARTNERSHIP AND JOINT ENTERPRISE So AS TO
ALLOW THE APPELLANT TO BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE FOR DAMAGES?-REAGAN V. LYBERGER
4 0
This case examined whether a partnership existed between a builder
and his bookkeeper. Guy and Peggy Lyberger entered into an agreement
with Mike Anderson, d/b/a Great Western Homes, for the construction of
a new house.41 Mike Reagan, who handled Great Western's bookkeep-
ing, attended a meeting in August 1994 with Anderson, the Lybergers,
and the bank that was funding the project to discuss how the money allo-
cated to the project was being spent.42 After the meeting, the Lybergers
dealt solely with Reagan on all financial matters.
The state filed criminal charges against Anderson, he pled guilty to
misappropriation of trust funds, and the court ordered him to pay $40,000
to unpaid subcontractors on the Lybergers' house job.43 The Lybergers
also brought a civil suit against Anderson, Reagan, and a concrete com-
pany for negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract, breach of war-
ranty, fraud, violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and
conversion. 44 Trial evidence showed that Anderson referred to Reagan
as his partner and that Reagan told third parties that he was Anderson's
partner. Other evidence showed that Reagan allowed Anderson to use
his credit card to purchase appliances for one house being built and that
Reagan lent Anderson $6,000 around the time that the Lybergers' house
was being built.45 In addition, Reagan testified that he and Anderson
were negotiating a "Profits Participation Agreement," under which Great
Western Homes would build homes and Reagan would act as business
manager. The agreement, which included provisions pertaining to profit
sharing and allocating losses and liabilities, was signed in October 1994,
after construction began on the Lybergers' house but before the closing
occurred in March 1995.46
The jury found that Anderson and Reagan were involved in both a
partnership and a joint enterprise and that Reagan was part of the con-
spiracy that damaged the Lybergers. Thus, the Lybergers were able to
recover the awarded $45,799.14 jointly and severally from Anderson and
Reagan.47 Reagan appealed, contending that there was no evidence, or
insufficient evidence, to support the jury's finding of his liability based on
partnership, joint enterprise, or conspiracy.48
40. 156 S.W.3d 925 (Tex App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).




45. Id. at 927.
46. Id. at 926-27.




Under the Texas Revised Partnership Act, "an association of two or
more persons to carry on a business for profit as owners creates a part-
nership, whether the persons intend to create a partnership and whether
the association is called a 'partnership,' 'joint venture,' or other name. '49
The factors indicating the formation of a partnership include: "(1) receipt
or right to receive a share of profits of the business; (2) expression of
intent to be partners in the business; (3) participation or right to partici-
pate in control of the business; (4) sharing or agreeing to share losses of
the business or liability for claims by third parties against the business;
and (5) contributing or agreeing to contribute money or property to the
business."'50 Not all of the factors must be present for a partnership to
exist, and no one factor is dispositive.5 t If a partnership exists, then "a
partner is liable jointly and severally for all debts and obligations of the
partnership. "52
The Dallas Court of Appeals applied the statutory factors indicating
the formation of a partnership to the evidence presented at trial and
found sufficient evidence to support a finding of a partnership. First, the
court found that Reagan "was actively participating in the home building
business with Anderson and had at least some control over the business's
financial aspects."' 53 Second, the fact that Anderson referred to Reagan
as his partner and Reagan identified himself as Anderson's partner sup-
ported Anderson and Reagan's subjective intent to operate as partners. 54
Finally, by lending money to Anderson and allowing Anderson to charge
appliances on his credit card, Reagan contributed money to the busi-
ness.55 This evidence fit within the second, third, and fifth factors in the
above list. Therefore, the court found sufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding that Reagan and Anderson were engaged in a partner-
ship.56 The court also found that the "Profits Participation Agreement"
between Reagan and Anderson supported their conclusion. Even though
they did not sign this agreement until after construction on the Lybergers'
house had already commenced, the court found that their subsequent
written agreement on how to allocate profits and losses, in addition to the
three factors already present in the business relationship, suggested that
Anderson and Reagan intended their business relationship to be a part-
nership from the beginning.57
49. Id. (quoting TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 2.02 (Vernon Supp. 2004-
05)).
50. Id. at 927-28 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 2.03 (Vernon Supp.
2004-05)).
51. Id. at 928 (citing McDowell v. McDowell, 143 S.W.3d 124, 129 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2004, pet. denied)).
52. Id. at 927 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.04 (Vernon Supp.
2004-05)).







In the alternative, Reagan, relying on two prior cases, argued that the
Lybergers' claims against him based on the alleged partnership should fail
because the Lybergers did not name the partnership as a party in the
suit. 58 The court distinguished the cases and found his reliance on them
"misplaced. ' 59 In Fincher, the issue was whether a partner could be held
individually liable when only the partnership had been sued; the court
concluded that joint and several liability of the individual partners fol-
lowed as a matter of law once liability against a partnership was estab-
lished.60 In Wolfe, the court upheld the jury's finding that Wolfe was not
liable on the basis of partnership, but only because the plaintiff did not
assert partnership in either its trial pleadings or its motion for new trial. 61
Thus, the court found no cases "requiring that the partnership entity be
sued separately to hold the individual partners liable." 62 The court of
appeals therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment.63
D. A GENERAL PARTNER'S CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE-
CAN A GENERAL PARTNER BE HELD LIABLE FOR A PARTNERSHIP
DEBT AFTER RECEIVING A DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY?-
UNITED STATES V. WILLIAMS
6 4
In this case, the government sued Charles Williams, D.D.S. under the
Federal Debt Collections Procedures Act and common law to collect a
debt of Hillside Apartments Partnership, of which Williams was a general
partner. In October 1975, the Partnership executed a $327,500 promis-
sory note payable to the Farmers Home Administration ("FHA") of the
USDA.65 The Partnership also obtained the loan through the FHA's Ru-
ral Development Housing Loan Program, now known as the Rural Hous-
ing Service ("RHS"). Williams signed the loan documents as a partner of
the Partnership.66 These loans were used to build an apartment complex
in Mexia, Texas. In May 1987, Williams and his wife filed a chapter 7
bankruptcy petition. Williams did not list the debt of the Partnership,
although he did list the Partnership as an asset.67 Williams also did not
list the USDA, the FHA, or RHS as creditors, nor did any of those enti-
58. Id. Reagan cited Fincher v. B & D Air Conditioning and Heating Co., 816 S.W.2d
509 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) and Texaco, Inc. v. Wolfe, 601
S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) for the proposition
that the alleged partnership must be sued in order for him to be held liable as a partner.
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing Fincher, 816 S.W.2d at 513).
61. Id. at 929 (citing Wolfe, 601 S.W.2d at 741).
62. Id. It certainly is the better practice to bring an action against a partnership and all
partners. In fact, it would be interesting to know how the case would have been decided if
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.05 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05)) applied, which in
some cases requires exhaustion of partnership assets before a partner's assets may be pur-
sued to satisfy a judgment.
63. Id.
64. No. 3:03-CV-2321-D, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15857 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2005).
65. Id. at *2.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *3-4.
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ties receive notice of Williams's bankruptcy petition.68 Because Williams
was hospitalized for four weeks in April 1987 for treatment of a sub-
stance-abuse problem and thus was unable to provide his counsel with
information concerning his creditors and assets, the court found that Wil-
liams' failure to list the debt was not intentional.69 Williams's bankruptcy
case was treated as a no-asset case, and he received a discharge in No-
vember 1987. The case was closed in April 1992.70
Because Williams did not list the Partnership debt in his bankruptcy
filings, the USDA never released Williams from his obligations under the
loan documents that he executed in connection with the loan to the Part-
nership. Therefore, in 1997, the USDA notified Williams that the Part-
nership needed to take corrective action or the debt would be
accelerated. Williams informed the USDA that he had relinquished his
Partnership interest in 1987, but did not mention his bankruptcy.71 The
USDA accelerated the debt in December 1997 and purchased the apart-
ment complex at foreclosure in August 1998. A deficiency of $144,183.17
remained after the proceeds of the sale were credited against the debt.72
The USDA demanded payment from Williams for the deficiency, plus
accrued interest, which totaled $224,315.93 as of June 1, 2005. 73
Williams argued that his personal liability for the Partnership's debts
was discharged in his bankruptcy. 74 His position was that the USDA had
an unmatured, contingent claim that arose before he filed his bankruptcy
petition. The USDA asserted that the claim did not arise in 1987 because
the Partnership was performing in accordance with its obligations under
the loan agreement;75 rather, the USDA contended that its enforceable
claim against Williams arose in 1997 when the Partnership defaulted on
the loan.76
To resolve the issue of when the USDA's claim against Williams arose,
the court considered the Bankruptcy Code's definition of a "claim" and
case law involving that definition. The court concluded that "Congress
intended the term 'claim' to be read broadly so that 'all legal obligations
of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent[,] will be able to be
dealt with in the bankruptcy case.'"77
Further, the court found that a claim exists in bankruptcy only if,
before filing the bankruptcy petition, the creditor had a right to payment
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *4.
71. Id. That would all have been sorted out in the bankruptcy, of course, had all of the
requisite information been included in the filings.
72. Id. at *5.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *6.
76. Id. at *7.
77. Id. at *8 (citing In re Nat'l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 405 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (Sand-
ers, C.) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, at 22 (1977)).
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under the relevant non-bankruptcy law. 78 However, a creditor "need not
have a cause of action that is ripe for suit outside of bankruptcy in order
for it to have a pre-petition claim for purposes of the [Bankruptcy]
Code."' 79 In this case, the Partnership incurred the debt to the USDA
before Williams filed his bankruptcy petition. 80 Williams, as a general
partner of the Partnership, could be held jointly and severally liable for
partnership debts under the Texas Uniform Partnership Act, which gov-
erned in 1975 and in 1987.81 Thus, the USDA could enforce the Partner-
ship's obligation directly against Williams without having to first proceed
against the Partnership. 82 Even if the USDA's claim against Williams was
considered to be unmatured, contingent, or both before his bankruptcy
filing, the USDA still had a "claim" against Williams at the time of his
filing as defined by the Bankruptcy Code.83 Consequently, the claim
would have been dischargeable in bankruptcy. 84
The court next addressed whether Williams's failure to list the USDA
as a creditor precluded the USDA's claim from being discharged. 85 The
court concluded that Williams's failure to list the USDA as a creditor was
inadvertent, that no court's docket would be unduly disrupted by al-
lowing Williams to discharge the debt, and that the USDA did not suffer
any prejudice by the discharge of the debt because Williams's bankruptcy
was a no-asset case.86 Thus, the court held that Williams's debt to the
USDA was discharged in his bankruptcy. 87
E. DISSOLUTION OF A PARTNERSHIP-DID A PARTNER BREACH A
DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT, AND WAS THE OTHER PARTNER'S CLAIM
FOR AN ACCOUNTING BARRED BY LIMITATIONS?-
BOULLE v. BOULLE88
Franco Boulle and Jean-Raymond Boulle formed the Boulle Group
and the Boulle Partnership, a mining business. They also formed Exdiam
with other investors. 89 During litigation between the Partnership and an-
other company, a disagreement between Franco and Jean led to the disso-
lution of the Boulle Partnership. 90 Jean confirmed in a letter to Franco
78. Id. at *9 (citing Nat'l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. at 405; Carrieri v. Jobs.com, Inc., 393
F.3d 508, 524, 525 n.17 (5th Cir. 2004)).
79. Id. at *9-10 (quoting Nat'l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. at 405).
80. Id. at *11.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *13 (citing In re Loewen Group Int'l, Inc., 274 B.R. 427, 438-39 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2002) for the proposition that creditors may assert claims against debtors in bank-
ruptcy for all amounts owed to the creditor as of the petition date, even if the amounts are
unmatured).
84. Id. at *14.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *20.
87. Id.
88. 160 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).




dated August 20, 1991 that "any existing partnership" had been dissolved
on January 1, 1991.91 On June 22, 1992, Franco and Jean executed an
agreement to separate the interests in the Boulle Group and the Boulle
Partnership. 92 Under the agreement, Franco was to convey to Jean any
interest that Franco might have in the Boulle Partnership projects, includ-
ing Exdiam, its Arkansas Diamond Development Corporation joint ven-
ture ("ADDC"), and any other entity that he owned jointly with Jean. 93
In return, Jean paid Franco $45,000, assumed all of Franco's liabilities
related to the projects, and assigned to Franco a "five percent (5%) inter-
est in the net revenues received by Jean Boulle from the projects in which
Franco Boulle transfers his interest to Jean Boulle under this agreement,
with a maximum of $5,000,000."' 9 4 Jean then transferred 85% of the in-
terest in ADDC to a corporation he owned, Diamond Mining Company
of America ("DMCA"). Another of Jean's companies, Maria Investment
Limited, held the stock of DMCA. In 1993, Maria Investment Limited
conveyed its DMCA stock to a publicly traded Canadian company, which
Jean and a colleague acquired earlier that year and re-named Diamond
Fields Resources, Inc. ("DFR"). 95 Significant nickel deposits were found
in one of DFR's mining interests in Canada, and Jean and his colleague
conveyed those deposits to a large Canadian mining company.96 In re-
turn for that conveyance, Jean received stock in the mining company val-
ued at more than $250 million. 97 Franco sued Jean for his percentage of
Jean's "net revenues" from the transaction, claiming breach of contract,
fraud, rescission, breach of fiduciary duty, and a partnership accounting. 98
Jean argued that Franco never owned any interest in most of the
projects at issue and that the one project in which Franco did own an
interest, ADDC, did not generate any net revenues. Thus, Jean had no
duty to pay Franco under the Agreement's five-percent provision.99 Jean
also argued that even if the five-percent provision were intended to in-
clude receipts realized from the sale of a project, Franco's claim was
barred by the statute of limitations because Jean transferred his interest
in the projects more than four years before Franco filed the lawsuit. 10°
Therefore, the trial court granted Jean's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, Franco argued that the trial court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment on the breach-of-dissolution-agreement claim, as it misin-
terpreted the terms of the agreement. In addition to mineral production
from a project, Franco argued that "revenue" included receipts generated
91. Id. at 170-71.




96. Id. at 171-72.
97. Id. at 172. If you followed this bouncing ball, you should work for the CIA!
98. Id.
99. Id. at 173.
100. Id.
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by the sale or transfer of the project itself.10 1 Further, Franco argued that
Jean "received" revenue when he sold the DFR stock for $250 million,
not when he transferred partnership assets in exchange for shares of
DFR. 102 The court concluded that the terms "revenue," "net revenue,"
and "received" were subject to two or more reasonable interpretations,
and thus the agreement was ambiguous. The ambiguity prevented the
court from upholding Jean's summary judgment for breach of the dissolu-
tion agreement.' 0 3
Franco also argued that his claim for a partnership accounting was not
barred by limitations. 10 4 A partner has a right to an accounting at the
date of dissolution if there is no agreement otherwise.10 5 Franco argued
that the agreement, which was dated June 22, 1992, was an agreement
otherwise. 10 6 However, the agreement did not mention accounting. The
court refused to "imply an agreement to allow an accounting for an indef-
inite period of time when the record contains no evidence of such an
agreement."'01 7 Because the statute of limitations for partnership ac-
counting is four years10 8 and Franco's right to an accounting from Jean
accrued as of the dissolution date, January 1, 1991, Franco's claim for an
accounting was barred by limitations. 10 9
F. INDEMNIFICATION-MUST A TEXAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
INDEMNIFY A FORMER OFFICER OF ITS CORPORATE PREDECESSOR
UNDER THE TEXAS BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT?-
GALLEY V. APOLLO ASSOCIATED SERVICES, LTD. 110
In this case, a former officer of a Texas limited partnership's corporate
predecessor sought indemnification for attorney's fees that the officer in-
curred while successfully defending claims brought against him by the
partnership. 1 ' Apollo Associated Services, Ltd. sued Mark Galley for
tortious interference with business relations, misappropriation of trade
secrets, breach of loyalty, conversion, breach of contract, and conspiracy
arising from his actions as an employee and officer of Apollo Associated
Services, Incorporated ("Apollo Inc."), the predecessor-in-interest to
Apollo Ltd." 2 Galley moved for summary judgment and counter-
claimed, seeking indemnification from Apollo Ltd. for his expenses and
attorney's fees under the Texas Business Corporation Act ("TBCA"). 113
101. Id.
102. Id. at 173-74.
103. Id. at 174.
104. Id. at 175-76.
105. Id. at 176.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(c) (Vernon 1999)).
109. Id.
110. 177 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.) (not designated
for publication).





The trial court partially granted summary judgment, and Galley moved to
add Apollo Inc. as an indispensable party to the litigation. Under court
order, Appollo Ltd. added Appollo Inc. as a defendant. 114 Apollo Ltd.
then nonsuited its remaining claims against Galley and moved for sum-
mary judgment, seeking dismissal of Galley's counterclaim for indemnifi-
cation. The trial court granted the motion and Galley appealed. 1 5
Galley's employment with Apollo Inc. terminated sixteen months
before Apollo Ltd. purchased Apollo Inc.'s assets. In the asset purchase
agreement, Apollo Ltd. agreed to assume and pay Apollo Inc.'s debts and
liabilities as of December 31, 2001, to pay all contract obligations, and to
hold Apollo Inc. harmless from any and all liability on the existing con-
tracts-one of which was the employment agreement between Galley and
Apollo, Inc.116
Galley argued that because Apollo Ltd. purchased Apollo Inc.'s assets,
Apollo Ltd. should indemnify him for his litigation costs under Article
2.02-1 of the TBCA.117 Apollo Ltd., on the other hand, contended that
because it was not a corporation, it should not be subject to the statutory
indemnification provision of the TBCA. 118 Apollo Ltd. further argued
that because indemnification of Galley would be a liability of Apollo Inc.,
and Apollo Inc.'s liabilities were not included in the asset-purchase agree-
ment, Apollo Ltd. should not be liable for Galley's indemnification
claim."19
The court recognized that the TBCA applies to corporations and pred-
ecessors of corporations but not to a Texas limited partnership, unless a
corporation acquires the partnership or merges with a partnership to be-
come a corporate entity.120 Because Apollo Ltd. was not a predecessor in
interest to a corporation but a successor in interest of a corporation, the
court found that Apollo Ltd. was not included in the Article 2.02-1 defini-
tion of corporation. 121 The Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act
("TRLPA") also contains an indemnification provision. 22 Although
Galley requested indemnification under this TRLPA provision in his sec-
ond amended counterclaim, he abandoned the issue on appeal, contend-
ing only that he was entitled to indemnification under the TBCA. 23 In a
footnote, the court of appeals noted that the TRLPA only provides dis-
cretionary indemnification of a limited partnership's employees and
agents.124 Thus, even if Galley had pursued the indemnification claim
114. Id. at 525-26.
115. Id. at 526.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 527.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 528.
121. Id.






under TRLPA on appeal and the TRLPA provision was found to be ap-
plicable, the provision would not mandate that Apollo Ltd. indemnify
him. 2 5 The court of appeals therefore upheld the trial court's summary
judgment on the indemnification claim. 126
G. PARTNERSHIP-RELATED ISSUES PRESENTED IN LITIGATION
Several cases presented partnership-related issues in litigation, requir-
ing the courts to construe the scope of a partnership, to decide whether to
grant mandamus relief for an order to compel production of documents
during discovery, and to determine whether notice of delinquent taxes
could be imputed to a partnership when delivered to an alleged partner.
1. Scope of a Partnership-Did the Partnership Exist for the
Development of Multiple Oil and Gas Wells?-Texas Nom Limited
Partnerships v. Akuna Matata Investments, Ltd.12 7
John Mathewson and Martin O'Neill started Garrison, Ltd., an oil- and
gas-exploration business, in San Antonio in 1995.128 O'Neill was Garri-
son's sole limited partner and owned a 99% limited partner's interest.
Texas Nom Limited Partnership owned the remaining 1% interest. Its
general partner, Roland Hurni-Gosman and his wife, Ann, both acquaint-
ances of Mathewson, orally agreed to invest $250,000 from their retire-
ment account, Akuna Matata Investments, Ltd., in Garrison to develop
oil and gas wells in Colorado County (known as the "Gracey Ranch"
project). After some of the wells drilled in Colorado County made a
profit, Akuna Matata requested a profit distribution; however, Garrison
never responded. As a result, Akuna Matata filed suit against O'Neill,
Mathewson, and Texas Nom, claiming that they breached their oral
agreement and their fiduciary duty to Akuna Matata.12 9
During a bench trial, O'Neill and Texas Nom claimed that the oral
partnership agreement was not for the development of multiple wells in
Colorado County, but for the development of only one well, which turned
out to be a dry hole.' 30 Thus, they argued that they did not breach the
agreement or any fiduciary duty to Akuna Matata because there were no
profits to distribute.'31 Regardless, the trial court found in favor of
Akuna Matata and awarded $225,309 in damages and $139,780 in attor-
ney's fees. 132
Texas Nom argued on appeal that there was legally insufficient evi-
dence to support a finding that the scope of the oral partnership between
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. No. 04-04-00447-CV, 2005 WL 159459 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 26, 2005, pet.
denied).
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the parties involved the development of multiple wells. Consequently,
the court of appeals first examined the evidence.
During the trial, both O'Neill and Roland testified to the existence of
the partnership, but their testimony differed on its scope.133 Roland
claimed that the partnership was formed to develop multiple oil and gas
wells in Colorado County, and O'Neill argued that the partnership was
established to drill only one well. However, O'Neill also testified that the
Gracey Ranch project comprised all wells drilled in Colorado County.
The court held that the trial court had sufficient evidence to conclude that
an oral partnership existed for the development of multiple wells in Colo-
rado County.134 Further, the court held that a fiduciary duty existed as a
matter of law because both parties testified that a partnership existed.135
Alternatively, Texas Nom argued that the agreement was too indefinite
to be enforceable because the following terms were not specified in the
agreement: (1) each partner's percentage of ownership; (2) the oil and gas
leases to be developed; (3) the number of wells and their location; (4)
additional capital contributions; (5) profit distribution and return of capi-
tal; (6) control of the partnership; and (7) the duration of the partner-
ship.136 The court disagreed with Texas Nom's contention, finding that
the record contained evidence regarding most of the partnership's
terms. 137 That evidence showed that profit distribution, capital return,
and each partner's percentage of ownership were all based on the relative
amount of the partner's capital contributions. Trial evidence indicated
that the partnership's scope was to develop all of the oil and gas leases in
Gracey Ranch. Texas Nom was to contribute any and all additional capi-
tal needed. 138 The fact that the agreement did not cover the duration,
management, or control of the partnership did not make the partnership
agreement too indefinite to be enforceable. 139 Rather, the Texas Revised
Partnership Act supplied any missing terms. 40 Under the Texas Revised
Partnership Act, either party could terminate the partnership at any time,
and each partner had equal rights to manage and conduct the partner-
ship's business. 141
Texas Nom also argued that the agreement was unenforceable under
the statue of frauds. 142 Because Akuna Matata's interest in the partner-
ship was a working interest in oil and gas and a conveyance of a working
interest in oil and gas under Texas law is a real-property interest subject
to the statute of frauds, they reasoned that the agreement was unenforce-
133. Id. at *3.
134. Id. at *4.
135. Id. at n.3.




140. Id. (citing Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. 1976)).
141. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-2.06, § 4.01(d) (Vernon Supp.
2004-05)).
142. Id. at *5.
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able.143 However, the court found that an exception to the statute of
frauds applied-when one party fully performs a contract. 144 Akuna
Matata contributed $250,000 to the partnership, which was its only obli-
gation under the agreement. Because Akuna Matata fully performed, the
statute of frauds did not bar the oral agreement. 145 The court affirmed
the trial court's judgment, awarding Akuna Matata reliance damages,
which included reimbursement of the investment it made in the partner-
ship, and attorney's fees, which are recoverable in Texas in a successful
suit on an oral contract.146
2. Can Notice of Delinquent Taxes Be Imputed to a Partnership?-
Tierra Sol Joint Venture v. City of El Paso 147
The City of El Paso filed suit against Tierra Sol Joint Venture to collect
delinquent taxes on two parcels of land. The Joint Venture was formed in
1981 to acquire the two parcels. 148 The Joint Venture originally was
owned by five investors, but after a series of transactions, James E. Bran-
son, Jr. and Robert C. Samuel, who was not one of the original investors,
were the remaining partners. During trial, Branson denied that the Joint
Venture received notices of the delinquent taxes. Samuel testified that he
was not a partner of the Joint Venture between 1982 and 1995, although
he did not allege that he had not received notices of the delinquency. 149
On the other hand, an employee of the City's central appraisal district
testified that the records listed Samuel as the owner of the two parcels
from 1982 through 1995.150 Furthermore, an employee for the City's tax
assessor and collector testified that the tax bills sent to Samuel for the
two parcels were not returned to the City as undeliverable. After a bench
trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of the City, finding that
the Joint Venture owned the two parcels on January 1 of the tax years
1989 through 1995, that Samuel was a partner of the Joint Venture from
1982 through 1995, and that the City had sent all tax bills and delinquent
notices to Samuel as required by law.151
On appeal, the court had to determine whether Samuel was a partner
in the Joint Venture as early as 1982. If so, the delinquent-tax notices that
were sent to him would constitute notice to the Joint Venture. A partner-
ship under the Texas Revised Partnership Act is "the association of two
143. Id. An argument that a partnership interest is personal property, not real prop-
erty, may have been a successful argument here. See TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
6132b, § 5.02 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05), which states: "A partner's partnership interest is
personal property for all purposes." Similarly, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1,
§ 7.01 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) states: "A partnership interest is personal property. A part-
ner has no interest in specific limited partnership property."
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *5-6.
147. 155 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, pet. denied).
148. Id. at 505.
149. Id. at 505-06.




or more persons to carry on a business for profit as owners, whether the
persons intend to create a partnership and whether the association is
called a 'partnership,' 'joint venture,' or other name."'1 52 Samuel & Co.,
Inc. and the Joint Venture argued that "a partnership consists of an ex-
press or implied agreement containing four required elements: (1) a com-
munity of interest in the venture; (2) an agreement to share profits; (3) an
agreement to share losses; and (4) a mutual right of control or manage-
ment of the enterprise. ' 153 Even though Samuel had an interest in the
Joint Venture, they argued that there was no evidence of an agreement to
share profits and losses and no evidence of mutual right of control of the
Joint Venture.154 Branson testified that he had objected to the transfer of
an interest to Samuel and that he had never agreed to admit him as a new
partner or to share profits and losses with him. In fact, Branson con-
trolled the books and would not give Samuel access to them. Further,
Branson and Samuel filed separate tax returns because they could not
agree how to file a single return.155 Even though Samuel held himself out
as a partner of the joint venture between 1982 and 1995 in sworn plead-
ings and testimony in lawsuits between Branson and Samuel, a finding
that a partnership exists cannot be upheld if there is no evidence of one
of the elements of a partnership. 156 Thus, the court of appeals found that
there was legally insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding
of fact that Samuel was a partner in the Joint Venture from 1982 through
1995.
Because the court of appeals found legally insufficient evidence to sup-
port the trial court's finding that Samuel was a partner of the Joint Ven-
ture from 1982 through 1995, it followed directly that the trial court's
conclusion that the delinquency notices sent to Samuel were imputed to
the Joint Venture was erroneous as a matter of law. 157 Consequently, the
penalties and interest on the delinquent taxes would be cancelled unless
the City presented evidence that the property owner, the Joint Venture,
received the delinquent-tax notices. The undisputed evidence presented
at trial showed that the City sent the delinquency notices to Samuel.
158
The City presented no evidence that the Joint Venture received the no-
tices, and Branson testified at trial that the Joint Venture had not re-
ceived any delinquency notices after 1982.159 Therefore, the court
cancelled the penalties and interest on the delinquent taxes.160
152. Id. at 507 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-2.02(a) (Vernon Supp.
2004-05)).
153. Id. (citing Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1997);
TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-2.03) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05)).
154. Id. at 507-08.
155. Id. at 508.
156. Id. (citing Schlumberger, 959 S.W.2d at 176).
157. Id. at 504.
158. Id. at 508-09.




3. Writ of Mandamus-Is a Partnership Entitled to Mandamus Relief
for an Order Compelling a Former Partner's Discovery?-
In re West Texas Positron, Ltd.161
West Texas Positron, Ltd., a Texas limited partnership, West Texas Posi-
tron, L.L.C., its general partner, and Michael J. Whyte (collectively, the
''relators") brought a proceeding to seek a writ of mandamus to vacate an
order compelling production of documents in response to a discovery re-
quest in litigation against the Partnership by Nancy Cahill, a limited part-
ner and former employee of the Partnership. 162 The Partnership was
formed to operate a cyclotron facility in Lubbock. A written partnership
agreement dated September 30, 2002 named the LLC as the Partnership's
sole general partner and owner of a one-percent interest in the Partner-
ship. Whyte was the sole member of the LLC and a limited partner of the
Partnership, owning a 73-percent interest. Cahill owned a ten-percent in-
terest, with other individuals owning the balance of the interests. 163 The
Partnership's principal place of business was in San Francisco, California,
which also is where the Partnership's books, records, and accounts were
to be maintained. 164
After only a few months, Cahill terminated her employment with the
Partnership because Whyte allegedly refused to comply with the terms of
the agreement, refused to provide financial reports and an accounting,
and engaged in unethical business practices. 165 In September 2003, Cahill
filed the underlying action under Rule 202.166 In May and June 2004,
Cahill filed amended petitions asserting claims against the relators. The
relators counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty and misappropria-
tion of trade secrets, seeking a declaratory judgment that Cahill's original
suit was a breach of the partnership agreement and that her partnership
interest was properly terminated. 167 In June 2004, Cahill served a request
for production on the Partnership and on its general partner, the LLC.
The Partnership and the LLC objected, claiming that the request would
require them to disclose trade secrets. 168 In August 2004, Cahill filed a
motion to compel production and to impose sanctions. The Partnership
raises several arguments in response. First, the Partnership argued that it
had fully responded to the request under Rule 196.2(b) of Civil Proce-
dure and reiterated its objections. Second, the Partnership claimed that
the controversy pertained to the value of Cahill's partnership interest and
that the information that Cahill sought in the production request was not
161. No. 07-04-0506-CV, 2005 WL 146968 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Jan. 20, 2005, no pet.
h.).









relevant to that issue. 169 Further, because the parties agreed to have an
independent certified public accountant perform an evaluation to deter-
mine the value of Cahill's interest, the Partnership argued that it was un-
necessary for it to produce the documents that Cahill sought. 170 Finally,
the Partnership argued that if the "highly sensitive" information that Ca-
hill sought was disclosed to the Partnership's competitors, it would be
highly detrimental to the Partnership. In fact, Whyte believed that at the
time of the suit Cahill was working for one of the Partnership's
competitors. 17'
After a hearing at which no evidence was presented, the trial court
granted Cahill's motion to compel and directed the parties to enter into a
confidentiality agreement. 172 Further, the court ordered that certain pric-
ing information be released only to Cahill's counsel and experts. Cahill
also had to provide a list of all of the Partnership's customers to her
knowledge, and the Partnership had to produce all records pertaining to
the customers that Cahill listed.173 The record did not disclose whether
the trial court found that the information Cahill sought contained trade
secrets.
In this proceeding, the relators argued that they were entitled to man-
damus relief because they conclusively proved that the information re-
quested contained trade secrets and because Cahill did not prove that the
information she sought was necessary for a fair adjudication of her claims
against the Partnership. 74 The court disagreed, finding that there was
sufficient evidence to establish that the information Cahill sought was
necessary to a fair adjudication of her claims.175 Because the Partnership
was closely held and had been in existence for less than two years, the
Partnership's financial information was necessary to value Cahill's part-
nership interest.176 Cahill also had no other way to obtain the informa-
tion.177 Further, the Partnership had significant protection. The trial
court's order compelling discovery was conditioned on the parties' reach-
ing a mutually agreeable confidentiality agreement, which permitted the
relators to assert privilege with respect to some of the customer informa-
tion. The order also restricted the disclosure of pricing information to
Cahill's counsel and experts. Because the relators did not establish that
the trial court abused its discretion in entering the order and did not es-
tablish that they had no other remedies, the court denied the relators'
petition for writ of mandamus. 178
169. Id.
170. Id. at *3.
171. Id. at *2.
172. Id. at *3.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *4.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *5.
178. Id. Note the language of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 1.07(d)
(Vernon Supp. 2004-05): "A partner or an assignee of a partnership interest, on written
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request stating the purpose, may examine and copy, in person or by the partner's or as-
signee's representative, at any reasonable time, for any proper purpose, and at the part-
ner's expense, records required to be kept under this section and other information
regarding the business, affairs, and financial condition of the limited partnership as is just
and reasonable for the person to examine and copy."
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